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<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+TuoW3tWTToX7=PMhJ0Bg-JqP=ye=8ncQQj_96fSNapRo558Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Actually, computerized !=
centralized<br>
<br>
this is why technologists start to look for an online
solutions, as <br>
distributed needs online, which not centralized.<br>
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It is centralized one way or the other. <br>
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<div class="gmail_quote">If you have computers in each polling
station feeding into a central computer</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">that tallies the results, then the
programmers for the central computer can <br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">be bribed or coerced into flipping
every nth vote for some candidate, and it</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">is game over. <br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">If there is no central computer, there
still is a program that has to be loaded</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">on tens of thousands of distributed
computers. </div>
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<p>Legitimacy comes from edges. And in the talk we'll see how
counting can be done on edges and so that edges (people) come to
consensus. </p>
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cite="mid:CA+TuoW3tWTToX7=PMhJ0Bg-JqP=ye=8ncQQj_96fSNapRo558Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<div class="gmail_quote">That program has to be <br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">identical on all machines.</div>
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<p>Right now I have a program of behaviour in my head. I am 100%
sure that it is not the same as anything in heads of others. At
the same time we follow same protocol!<br>
</p>
<p>Just say no to mandated electoral program(s)!</p>
<p>We should have a protocol, following which edges are able to
correctly observe and participate in voting.</p>
<p>When, as a developer, I have a protocol, I develop program for my
own party. I will open source it. But you don't have to trust my
code. You can write your own.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+TuoW3tWTToX7=PMhJ0Bg-JqP=ye=8ncQQj_96fSNapRo558Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<div class="gmail_quote"> Again, it requires a specialist to
create the program</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">and a specialist to audit it, and those
can be bribed/coerced. What we lost <br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">here is that the lay person has no way
of knowing that a program is fair, <br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">or tampered with, other than "trust me,
I am a specialist". Even if we pass</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">that point, there is no way to
guarantee that what was audited is actually</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">what was loaded into the machines. <br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<p>Just say no to mandated electoral device(s)!</p>
<p>I don't understand use of machines in booths electronic or
mechanical. I don't get. If there is a special place, people came
in, someone can count paper.</p>
<p>When it is voter's device, scheme will be equivalent to an online
one. I subscribe to mantra: I provide a device, and I provide a
program that plays according to voting protocol. Common is only
protocol.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+TuoW3tWTToX7=PMhJ0Bg-JqP=ye=8ncQQj_96fSNapRo558Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<div class="gmail_quote">Paper has none of those problems, given
enough eyeballs watching the</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">whole process. </div>
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<p>Paper is not end to end verifiable. Simple online scheme, which
I'll present is end to end verifiable. Verifiability is what
people look for.</p>
<p>If there were an end to end verifiable voting, then dictator in
Belarus would've been removed after 4-8 years, no problemo. May be
in 12 with coercion on edges. That is why there is a huge appetite
for online voting tech, its an appetite for verifiability.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>This is a spoiler alert for a part of my talk.</p>
<p>Before start of August elections in Belarus, broader society have
pledged money and organization to setup continuous video
surveillance of ballot boxes. There was an official suggestion and
an official f-off by electoral commission. Ultimately, what worked
were measures that increased transparency of the process.<br>
</p>
<p>In other words, in places with possible coercion (vote buying) on
ends, we should add surveillance tech to ensure correct counting.
See, tech is a tool, and there is room for improvement even with
paper!<br>
</p>
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